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Legal Approaches to ‘Unwanted’  
EU Citizens in the Netherlands 
Sandra Mantu* , Paul Minderhoud* , Carolus Grütters*  
This contribution examines the legal powers that Dutch authorities have to restrict the right to free move-
ment of mobile but ‘unwanted’ EU citizens, including measures that seek to expel and ban EU citizens 
from re-entering the Netherlands. The article defines ‘unwanted’ EU citizens as mobile EU citizens in re-
spect of whom national authorities seek to take measures to restrict their right of residence, either on the 
grounds of their being an unreasonable burden on the Dutch social assistance system or in respect of 
public policy and public security. We analyse the relevant EU legal rules, their interpretation by the Court 
of Justice of the EU and their national implementation and application in order to show the legal con-
straints faced by national authorities when seeking to restrict EU mobility. This legal study is supple-
mented by a discussion of existing data on the number of EU citizens expelled or removed from the 
Netherlands. Our analysis suggests that, due to the legal protection enjoyed by mobile EU citizens against 
measures restricting their residence rights, the Dutch authorities encourage voluntary departure as  
a pragmatic solution to the presence of ‘unwanted’ EU citizens. 
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Introduction 
EU nationals and, especially, nationals of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states are a fast-growing 
group of migrants in the Netherlands. Unlike non-EU migrants, EU nationals can move to another EU 
state with few formalities and are entitled to access the labour market on an equal footing with nation-
als. Moreover, as EU citizens, their right to reside is protected against national measures seeking to re-
strict or end their stay in a host EU state. Data on the composition of the Dutch population (CBS 2021) 
suggest that the increase in the number of EU citizens in the Netherlands is linked to the EU’s enlarge-
ment eastwards and the progressive opening of the Dutch labour market to CEE nationals. Yet, the 2004 
and 2007 EU enlargements towards countries with poorer standards of living and pay caused debates 
about the desirability and effects of CEE mobility, including calls to limit it. CEE nationals are perceived 
as a source of cheap labour that has the potential to disrupt the Dutch labour market and undercut wages 
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for national workers (Cremers 2011), as a potential burden on the Dutch welfare state due to their reli-
ance on benefits (Kramer 2017) and as source of criminality and ‘otherness’ (Brouwer, van der Woude 
and van der Leun 2018).  
The Netherlands is not unique in questioning the benefits of EU mobility and in conflating cheap la-
bour with welfare tourism and criminality as markers of ‘unwanted’ EU mobility (Anderson 2012; 
Karstens 2020; Mantu 2018). Based on public and political discourses, poor EU citizens, criminal EU 
citizens or EU citizens claiming benefits can all be labelled ‘unwanted’, while legally they enjoy a funda-
mental right to EU mobility and the protection of EU law. In this contribution, our focus is on the legal 
dimension of ‘unwanted’ EU mobility in the Netherlands. As such, we examine on what grounds the 
Dutch authorities can restrict or deny EU residence rights and in which situations such measures can be 
accompanied by expulsion and exclusion from the Netherlands.  
Our contribution is structured as follows. The second section presents the national context in which 
CEE mobility occurs and our methodological approach. The next section examines the relevant EU rules 
concerning the right of residence for mobile EU citizens. Then follows a discussion of the denial of EU 
residence rights where the EU citizen no longer meets the relevant conditions from the perspective of 
both EU and Dutch law and legal practice. The fifth section focuses on the restriction of EU residence 
rights on the grounds of public policy and public security, whereas the sixth examines the same issue in 
cases of abuse or fraud. Finally, the penultimate section focuses on voluntary departure as a practical 
alternative to dealing with unwanted EU citizens, before the last section concludes with an overall as-
sessment of the Dutch legal response. 
Contextual and methodological note 
According to Eurostat data, the Netherlands hosts around 570,000 mobile EU citizens, of whom 43 per 
cent (245 000) are CEE nationals. Almost half of all CEE nationals are Polish nationals. They constitute 
the largest group of mobile EU citizens in the Netherlands (see Figure 1). Another 45 per cent of mobile 
EU citizens are made up of nationals from France, Spain, Belgium, Italy, the UK and Germany. The re-
maining 12 per cent consists of very small numbers of nationals from the remaining EU states. The avail-
able data reflect the number of EU citizens who are registered in the Netherlands and as such are known 
to the authorities. Based on the assumption that many EU citizens do not register in the Netherlands, 
existing numbers should be seen as a relative indication, rather than as an absolute value. For example, 
in 2017, it was estimated that some 90,000 Polish citizens resided unregistered in addition to the official 
number of 160,000 registered Polish citizens (Gijsberts, Andriessen, Nicolaas and Huijnk 2018). 
In 2018, Statistics Netherlands listed work as the top reason for EU citizens moving to the Nether-
lands, followed by family reunion, study and other purposes (CBS 2020). The upward trend concerning 
EU mobility continued in 2020, with Polish nationals representing the top nationality of all incoming EU 
citizens (CBS 2021). EU-wide research has shown that the impact of mobile EU citizens on national wel-
fare states is minimal (ECAS 2014; ICF/GHK 2013). For the Netherlands, the percentage of CEE nationals 
receiving unemployment benefits is explained by their more vulnerable position in the Dutch labour 
market and their concentration in sectors (agriculture, hospitality, transport, logistics, construction) 
where temporary contracts, job insecurity and exploitative practices are more prevalent and are used 
as strategies to reduce labour costs (Strockmeijer 2019). Moreover, when compared with inactive Dutch 
nationals, the percentage of inactive EU citizens who rely on the welfare system is lower (Strockmeijer 
2019: 10). For its part, the Dutch government, through the voice of the Ministry of Social Affairs, sends 
mixed messages: it treats the number of EU citizens reliant on the welfare state as a problematic aspect 
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of free movement and one in need of close scrutiny (Asscher 2017; Kamp 2011; Koolmees, Ollongren, 
Knoops, van Ark and Keijzer 2019), while acknowledging that, in relative and absolute terms, this num-
ber is minimal (Asscher 2014).  
 
Figure 1. Citizens from Central and Eastern European states registered (as residents) in the Nether-
lands on 1 January 2019 
 
 
Source: Eurostat: EU and EFTA citizens who are usually resident in another EU/EFTA country as of 1 January (online data 
code: MIGR_POP9CTZ). 
 
Although Polish nationals – fraudulently claiming Dutch social benefits, sometimes as part of large 
organised schemes – and Romanian skimmers make headlines in Dutch popular press, official data on 
EU citizens expelled or removed from the Netherlands is scarce. Moreover, there are no centralised data 
on the number of EU citizens whose right of residence has been terminated. Kramer (2017) has pre-
sented some fragmented data on this issue that showed an increase – from 20 in 2012 to 680 in 2016  
– in the number of EU citizens whose residence was denied. We have not been able to obtain such data 
from the Dutch immigration authorities, ideally differentiated upon grounds for denial. The only data 
we have received show the number of EU citizens expelled but not the grounds upon which the expul-
sion measure was taken (see the section entitled ‘Filling the gap between expulsion and effective re-
moval’). 
In light of the legal focus of this contribution, by ‘unwanted EU citizens’ we understand mobile EU 
citizens in respect of whom national authorities seek to take measures to restrict their right of residence, 
either on the grounds of their being an unreasonable burden on the Dutch social assistance system or 
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citizens, we first examine the limits posed by EU law to restricting EU residence rights at the national 
level. To this end, we analyse EU primary (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU) 
and secondary law (Directive 2004/38) concerning the fundamental right to freedom of movement and 
its interpretation by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). CJEU jurisprudence constitutes the other im-
portant legal source of rights for EU citizens since the Court’s interpretation of EU law is binding for 
national authorities. We discuss CJEU jurisprudence that clarifies the link between the EU right to reside 
and access to social benefits in a host state and jurisprudence that addresses Member State obligations 
concerning measures taken on the grounds of public policy, public security and abuse of rights.  
Secondly, we analyse the implementation of EU provisions in the Dutch legal order and their appli-
cation by the administration and Dutch courts. In the Netherlands, the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service (IND) is the administrative body responsible for implementing the policy on foreign nationals, 
which includes the transposition of Directive 2004/38 into Dutch law. The relevant provisions of na-
tional law are Articles 8.7 to 8.25 of the Aliens Decree 2000 and the implementation rules found in the 
Implementation Guidelines of the Dutch Aliens Act (Vreemdelingencirculaire, (Vc) B10/2.3) and in the 
so-called Work Instructions (Werkinstructies, (WI) 2020/10). Because IND decisions can be appealed 
before a court of law, we also discuss Dutch jurisprudence on the denial of EU residence rights and on 
expulsion, supplemented by the examination of policy papers and briefs, reports, existing scholarship 
and general information on this issue. Finally, to explain the gap between law and practice, we discuss 
data on voluntary departure from the Dutch NGO Barka as an alternative to expulsion and exclusion 
orders.  
EU citizens’ right to reside in another Member State based on EU law 
EU citizens enjoy the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject 
to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them 
effect (Article 21 TFEU). EU workers and self-employed persons’ right to move and reside freely stems 
from Articles 45 and 49 TFEU, respectively. The conditions for the exercise of this right are detailed in 
secondary legislation, the most relevant pieces of which are Directive 2004/38 – applicable to all EU 
citizens – and Regulation 492/2011 – applicable only to EU workers.   
Directive 2004/38 applies to EU citizens and their family members – irrespective of nationality  
– who move to another EU state other than the state of nationality of the EU citizen. Depending on the 
length of residence, with three months and five years as the relevant thresholds, Directive 2004/38 pro-
vides for different residence rights, to which different conditions are attached. For residence shorter 
than three months, EU citizens must possess a valid ID or passport (Article 6). For residence longer than 
three months, Directive 2004/38 differentiates between economically active and economically inactive 
EU citizens (Article 7). Economically active EU citizens must meet the definition of the notions of ‘EU 
worker’ and, respectively, ‘self-employed’ as detailed in CJEU jurisprudence. Economically inactive EU 
citizens must have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden 
on the social assistance system of their host state and must possess comprehensive sickness insurance. 
Moreover, students must be enrolled at an educational establishment for the principal purpose of fol-
lowing studies. Union citizens who have resided legally and for a continuous period of five years in  
a host Member State have a right of permanent residence there (Article 16). Union citizens (and their 
family members) enjoy that right without any further conditions, thus even if they no longer have suffi-
cient resources or comprehensive sickness insurance cover. The Court has clarified that residence under 
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Directive 2004/38 constitutes an autonomous notion of EU law, which is to be interpreted as legal res-
idence that meets the requirements of Article 7.1  
Broadly speaking, Directive 2004/38 allows the host state to restrict the right to reside in three dif-
ferent scenarios. Firstly, where the EU citizen no longer meets the conditions attached to the exercise of 
the right to reside; secondly, on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health and, 
thirdly, in case of fraud or abuse of rights. The Directive lays down procedural safeguards (Articles 30 
and 31) to be observed by the Member States in respect of all scenarios. These are meant to ensure that 
EU citizens are notified of any decisions taken in respect of them and that those decisions are justified 
and open to judicial redress procedures.  
Restricting the EU right to free movement where the conditions attached to the exercise of the 
right of residence are not met 
General rules under EU law  
Based on Article 14(1) Directive 2004/38, EU citizens retain the right of residence for up to three 
months as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the host state’s social assistance sys-
tem. The main question here is what impact a request for social assistance has on the right to reside. 
Article 24(2) helps to elucidate this issue as it allows the host state to exclude EU citizens from receiving 
social assistance during the first three months of residence, when no conditions as to self-sufficiency are 
imposed. EU job-seekers can be excluded from receiving social assistance for the entire period of their 
job-seeking – this can last longer than three months – while students can be excluded from receiving 
maintenance aid for studies (study grants and student loans) prior to the acquisition of a right of per-
manent residence. Thus, the host state can see a request for social assistance made during the first three 
months of residence as placing an unreasonable burden on its system, leading to a denial of the right to 
reside based on Article 6. However, this provision is relevant only for economically inactive EU citizens. 
EU workers can rely on Article 45(2) TFEU and Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011 to claim equal treat-
ment with nationals of the host state when it comes to social assistance. Likewise, EU job-seekers, based 
on Article 14(4)(b), enjoy a right of residence as long as they can show that they are looking for a job 
and have a reasonable chance of finding one.2 Expulsion is equally not possible as long as job-seeking is 
ongoing. 
The right of residence for longer than three months is retained as long as the conditions set out in 
Article 7 concerning worker/self-employed status or sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness 
insurance continue to be met (Article 14(2) Directive 2004/38). This aspect has become increasingly 
problematic for economically inactive EU citizens, citizens with fragmented work-life histories plagued 
by unemployment and those working on short-term or zero-hour contracts (FEANTSA 2019; Mantu and 
Minderhoud 2019; O’Brien, Spaventa and de Coninck 2016). This is the profile of a large percentage of 
CEE citizens working in the Netherlands. Such citizens have problems meeting the conditions attached 
to the status of EU worker or self-employed person, or alternatively the sufficient resource condition 
attached to Article 7. ‘Asking for social benefits becomes a first step towards being considered an unrea-
sonable burden’ (Mantu and Minderhoud 2019: 313), leading to a denial of EU rights.  
A recurring issue in CJEU jurisprudence is whether sufficient resources can be derived from social 
benefits paid by the host state to economically inactive citizens or job-seekers and with what conse-
quences for the right to reside. This is explained by several factors: the ambiguous rules contained by 
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Directive 2004/38, including the lack of a clear definition of the notions of ‘unreasonable burden’ and 
‘sufficient resources’, the trend towards restricting access to social assistance for EU citizens in several 
Member States and the reclassification of mixed social security benefits as social assistance (Minder-
houd and Mantu 2017). The CJEU has recognised the right of the host state to end the right of residence 
of the person concerned but added that this should not be or become ‘the automatic consequence of 
relying on the social assistance system’.3  
Between 2013 and 2016, five important CJEU judgments were delivered on this topic (Brey, Dano, 
Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v UK),4 which are generally interpreted as minimising the prin-
ciple that there should be a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member 
State and nationals of other Member States resident there (Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017; 
Verschueren 2018). These cases raise the question of whether a host state can consider an application 
for social assistance as an indication that the EU citizen does not fulfil the sufficient resource condition 
and can consider that no right to reside based on EU law exists or whether the state must perform an 
individual assessment before reaching such a conclusion. The Court’s responses have varied, from indi-
vidual assessment is necessary in Brey, to no individual assessment beyond the rules expressly con-
tained in Directive 2004/38, either because no right to reside had ever existed (Dano) or because, as 
first-time job-seekers, the applicants were excluded from social assistance (Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto). 
Moreover, recent jurisprudence shows a resurgence in cases discussing whether a person meets the 
conditions of the definition of EU worker or self-employment and the retention of such statuses under 
Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38, since these categories of EU citizens enjoy equal treatment and cannot 
have their right of residence denied or cannot be expelled for claiming benefits.5  
EU citizens who have acquired a right of permanent residence can lose that right only in the situation 
expressly listed in Article 16(4), namely through absence from the host Member State for a period ex-
ceeding two consecutive years. Previous research has shown that several Member States are policing 
the acquisition of the right of permanent residence in light of its unconditional nature by checking more 
thoroughly the legality and continuity of residence leading to the acquisition of Article 16 rights. Such 
policing does not per se occur during the five years of initial residence; rather, as in the Netherlands, 
checks occur when the EU citizen claims social rights as a permanent resident entitled to full and equal 
treatment with nationals of the host state (Minderhoud 2018).  
No EU right to reside followed by an expulsion order   
Article 14 of Directive 2004/38 reflects the difference between the adoption of a decision establishing 
that no EU right to reside exists and the adoption of an expulsion measure or an exclusion order. Besides 
setting the conditions for the retention of the right to reside, Article 14 lists situations in which the host 
state is not allowed to adopt an expulsion measure against workers, self-employed persons and job-seekers 
where no public policy, public security or public health considerations are at stake. Per a contrario, in 
cases of economically inactive citizens, the host state may adopt an expulsion measure because the EU 
citizen or his/her family members became an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of 
the host state, provided that such a measure is not automatically adopted.  
Conceptually, it is possible – and not unthinkable – for a host state to adopt a measure establishing 
that no EU right to reside exists without adopting an expulsion measure. Belgian authorities sent many 
EU citizens letters asking them to leave since they did not meet the self-sufficiency condition attached 
to Article 7 rights. No expulsion measure was adopted against them, nor was enforcement seriously 
considered by the authorities (Valcke 2020). The explanation is linked with the fact that Directive 
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2004/38 allows the Member States to adopt an exclusion order only in respect of an EU citizen against 
whom an expulsion measure was adopted on the grounds of public policy or public security (Article 
15(3)). Thus, an EU citizen who no longer meets the conditions of Article 7 can lose the right to reside 
and an expulsion measure can be adopted against him or her but no exclusion order can be adopted, 
leading to the situation where the EU citizen can re-enter the host state (this issue is currently before 
the CJEU in Case C-719/19). Research by Heindlmaier (2020) on state practices in Austria and France 
shows that national authorities are aware of the limiting power of EU law and are unwilling to waste 
their resources on EU citizens. Third-country nationals (TCNs) over whom national authorities retain 
more power and against whom entry bans can be issued are seen as a more suitable and acceptable 
target when it comes to justifying spending scarce resources.  
Dutch legal rules and legal practice 
After the implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the Dutch legislation, the Dutch Aliens Act Implemen-
tation Guidelines ((Vc) B 10/2.3) provide detailed information, in the form of a sliding scale, about when 
a demand on public funds – consisting of an application for social assistance in accordance with the Dutch 
Social Assistance Act (now called the Participation Act) – results in the termination of the EU citizen’s lawful 
residence by the immigration authorities (IND) in line with the wording of Article 8.16(1) of the Aliens De-
cree. The sliding scale constitutes the Dutch attempt to implement effectively the ambiguous nature of Di-
rective 2004/38, balancing between the condition of sufficient resources and access to social assistance 
benefits as long as this does not place an unreasonable burden on the Dutch social assistance system. The 
policy’s central idea is that the longer an EU citizen is residing legally in the Netherlands, the longer s/he can 
ask for social assistance benefits without losing the right to reside (see Table 1). The sliding scale is relevant 
only for economically inactive EU citizens. EU workers cannot have their right of residence terminated for 
asking for supplementary benefits, while EU job-seekers have no entitlement to them.  
Each application for social assistance during the first two years of residence is considered unreason-
able and, in principle, will result in the termination of the residence. In this scenario, the IND will assess 
the appropriateness of the request while considering the following circumstances of each case: the rea-
son for the applicant’s inability to earn a living, its temporary or permanent nature, ties with the country 
of origin, family situation, medical situation, age, other applications for (social) services, the extent of 
previously paid social security contributions, the level of integration and the expectation for future so-
cial assistance needs. These circumstances refer partially to the circumstances mentioned in recital 16 
of Directive 2004/38. The sliding scale reflects the fact that an application for social assistance can con-
cern financial benefits to fully cover the EU citizen’s living expenses or only to supplement insufficient 
resources.  
 
Table 1. Sliding scale as of 1 January 2020 
Residence More than supplementary Supplementary 
< 2 years Any recourse Any recourse 
> 2 years 2 months or more 3 months or more 
> 3 years 4 months or more 6 months or more 
> 4 years 6 months or more 9 months or more 
Entire period During subsequent years 15 months within 3 years of residence 
Source: Implementation Guidelines of the Dutch Aliens Act B 10/2.3; Kramer (2017). 
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The Dutch government has explored the possibility of tightening the rules around social assistance 
to ensure that no benefits are paid out where doubts exist as to the legality of the residence. In practice, 
this issue can be complex: local authorities are responsible for deciding on entitlement to social assis-
tance, while the IND decides on the legality of residence. In some cases, the municipalities decided them-
selves that the application for benefits led to the loss of the right to reside and therefore did not provide 
any social assistance. According to the Central Appeals Tribunal (the highest court in social security 
cases) this is incorrect.6 While the municipality is competent to decide on the grant of a social assistance 
benefit, the competent authority to decide on the legality of residence is the IND (the immigration au-
thority). Municipalities have to assume the lawfulness of residence as long as the immigration authori-
ties have not taken a decision on it in light of the request for social assistance. Municipalities are obliged 
to report to the IND the granting of social assistance benefits to EU citizens who reside between three 
months and five years in the Netherlands. Only from the moment when the IND decides to withdraw the 
right of residence can the municipality stop the social assistance benefit. Kramer’s (2016) research has 
shown that, to decide on the lawfulness of residence, the IND often sends a letter listing 26 questions 
concerning the personal situation of the EU citizen, ranging from his or her place of residence, family 
ties, medical situation etc. to the ultimate question: ‘Why do you think that you are not an unreasonable 
burden on the public resources and why do you think that in your case termination of your right of 
residence is a disproportionate measure?’.  
There is little Dutch jurisprudence on this subject. This might indicate that there are not many inac-
tive EU citizens (staying less than five years in the Netherlands), who ask for social assistance, that the 
IND does not often withdraw the right of residence of these citizens or that EU citizens did not appeal 
against such a withdrawal. After the Dano judgment, there were some developments of a restrictive na-
ture though. In an unpublished court case dating from September 2015, the IND used the Dano reason-
ing regarding an inactive EU citizen who had asked for social assistance benefit but had never searched 
for work.7 According to the IND, it was current policy to consider such an EU citizen immediately as an 
unreasonable burden on Dutch public funds, ‘even if there was only an appeal on social assistance of one 
day’. Another case in which the Dano reasoning was used is a judgment by the District Court The Hague 
of 18 January 2016.8 In this case, the Court followed the immigration authorities and ruled that the Bul-
garian applicant never had a right of residence due to being unemployable and not speaking Dutch.  
Dutch legal practice on the termination of residence rights followed by expulsion  
In the Netherlands, Article 14(3) Directive 2004/38 stating that ‘an expulsion measure shall not be the 
automatic consequence of a Union citizen’s or his or her family member’s recourse to the social assis-
tance system of the host Member State’ is implemented with a different wording. Article 8.16(1) of the 
Dutch Aliens Decree uses the words ‘termination of the right of residence’ instead of the words ‘an ex-
pulsion measure’. The Council of State (the highest court in migration cases) has explicitly recognised 
this distinction in two recent judgments, marking a radical change in the assessment of this right. Ac-
cording to the Council of State, in the Dutch implementation of Article 14(3) the decision on the legality 
of the right of residence and the expulsion measure are interwoven. This is partly caused by the fact 
that, in the system of the Dutch Aliens legislation, the unlawfulness of residence gives the Dutch immi-
gration authorities the competence to expel the EU citizen. For the Council of State, the decision that 
there is no right of residence is therefore also an expulsion measure in the sense of Directive 2004/38. 
To do justice to the requirement laid down in Article 14(3) and recital 16 Directive 2004/38, a balancing 
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of interests is therefore needed in all cases wherein the immigration authorities decide that the right of 
residence of an inactive EU citizen has been terminated or had never existed.9  
The rulings that clarified this issue concerned a Romanian and a Polish citizen, respectively, who had 
never had sufficient means of subsistence and who were both homeless. The Romanian had appealed 
for a social assistance benefit but the Polish citizen had not. Both cases are also illustrative of how the 
Dutch IND treats homelessness, which is not a special legal category. Homeless EU citizens fall under 
the regime of Article 7(1)(b) Directive 2004/38 and are treated as not or as no longer having sufficient 
resources. They can be expelled but they do not fall under the public order regime of Article 27 (see 
section entitled ‘Restricting the EU right to reside’). In the above cases, the IND considered that the EU 
citizens had to leave the Netherlands because they had never enjoyed lawful residence based on EU law. 
The Council of State found premature the decision of the IND to terminate the right of residence. It stated 
that, even if there is no right of residence stemming from Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 (any more), 
an individual assessment must always be made as to whether or not the person concerned still has lawful 
residence or can be expelled. The Council of State’s insistence on the need for individual assessment will also 
impact on cases of EU citizens who have not met the residence conditions continuously but only during cer-
tain periods of time. In such cases, too, there was often no balancing of interests because the IND simply 
stated that there was no right of residence, notwithstanding the rules in the administrative guidelines. 
While individual assessment is deemed essential by the Council of State, questions can be raised 
about how this will work in practice. In what situation would the balancing of interests be to the ad-
vantage of the EU citizen? The Council of State refers in this context to the CJEU judgments in Brey, Vo-
mero and Garcia-Nieto but not to Dano and Alimanovic, where such a balancing of interests was expressly 
not considered necessary. According to a judgment of the District Court of Rotterdam, in practice the 
balancing of interests means motivating that the EU citizen places an unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance system.10 The Council of State argues that, if the balancing of interests is in favour of the EU 
citizen, this means that s/he cannot be expelled and is still deemed to have lawful residence in the Neth-
erlands. The question which then arises is what the nature and basis of that lawful residence is. Van 
Melle and Van Houwelingen (2019) propose that these inactive EU nationals be granted a right of resi-
dence based on Article 20 or 21 TFEU since Directive 2004/38 would not apply to them. We have doubts 
about this construction. In our view, in the situation outlined above, the right to reside is still derived 
from Directive 2004/38. The EU citizen qualifies as economically inactive and the income is apparently 
sufficient because, despite a stated shortage of it, the EU citizen may remain with those resources. This 
is a plausible solution because, according to Article 8(4) Directive 2004/38, there is no fixed resource 
requirement in EU law. Another solution would be less logical because if, according to the IND, ‘the con-
ditions were never met’, then there is no analogous right of residence based on Article 21 TFEU as in the 
O.&B. case,11 nor does expulsion lead to the departure from the territory of the Union as a whole, as is 
required for a right of residence based on Article 20 TFEU. 
Another possibility would be residence based on Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
by analogy with Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights ECHR (the right to private and family 
life) – except that this may reflect problems with the Dano and Alimanovic cases, where EU citizens were 
considered to fall outside the scope of the Charter, if they did not meet the conditions set out in the 
Directive. The legal basis upon which such EU citizens may nonetheless remain resident is relevant for 
the possibility to acquire permanent residence status under Directive 2004/38, which would then open 
the way towards full equal treatment in relation to social benefits and increased protection against ex-
pulsion. For example, although the immigration authorities are authorised to review the application of 
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Article 8 ECHR ex officio in the event of a termination of residence as a Union citizen, a successful appeal 
to Article 8 ECHR does not result in the person concerned having lawful residence as an EU citizen.12  
In September 2019, the Dutch Council of State asked the CJEU to clarify the effects of an expulsion 
decision on the right of an EU citizen to return to that state. The case concerns a Polish national who was 
expelled from the Netherlands in 2018 because he did not have sufficient resources and therefore did 
not have legal residence under Article 7(1)(b) Directive 2004/38.13 The Polish citizen stayed with 
friends in Germany for less than four weeks and then returned to the Netherlands, where he was ar-
rested and detained. The Council of State has to judge on the lawfulness of detention in light of Directive 
2004/38 and asked the CJEU to clarify whether the decision that an EU citizen has to leave the Nether-
lands is complied with when the EU citizen leaves the Netherlands within the designated period. If so, 
does the individual have legal residence immediately upon return? Alternatively, how long should he 
stay outside of the Netherlands?14 
Restricting the EU right to reside on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health  
The EU rules 
Directive 2004/38 allows the Member States to restrict the right to move and residence on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health (Article 27(1)). Restrictions include the refusal to allow 
exit or entry, the refusal to issue/renew a residence certificate or card, expulsion as well as exclusion 
orders or entry bans that prevent an EU citizen from re-entering a host state. Article 27 precludes the 
Member States from legality conflating public policy or public security with economic concerns, for ex-
ample by attempting to expel EU citizens who are claiming welfare rights or unemployed EU citizens as 
a matter of public policy or public security. Article 27 clearly states that ‘these grounds shall not be 
invoked to serve economic ends’.15 It further establishes a series of material guarantees that Member 
States must respect as a matter of EU law. They include the principle of proportionality, the requirement 
that any measure should be based on the personal conduct of the person concerned, the threat posed by 
the individual must be genuine and present, previous criminal convictions are to be considered insofar 
as they are evidence of a personal conduct constituting a present threat to public policy and the ban on 
general preventive measures. The Court has further clarified that the concepts of public policy and pub-
lic security need to be interpreted strictly and cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member States, 
although they enjoy some flexibility in determining the meaning of the two terms. Public health is strictly 
defined in Directive 2004/38 as being linked to illnesses with epidemic potential according to the World 
Health Organisation or other infectious or contagious parasitic diseases if restrictive measures are ap-
plicable to a country’s own nationals as well.  
The strength of the protection enjoyed by EU citizens against expulsion is linked with the length of 
their residence and their level of integration in the host state. Concerning the length of residence, Article 
28 of Directive 2004/38 provides for increased protection against expulsion after the acquisition of per-
manent residence – that is, after five years of continuous and legal residence in the host EU state. Per-
manent resident EU citizens and their family members can only be expelled on ‘serious’ grounds of 
public policy and public security. Where the permanent resident EU citizen has resided for longer than 
10 years in a host EU state, she can be expelled only on ‘imperative’ grounds of public security – this 
level of protection is reserved for EU citizens only, TCN family members are excluded. Furthermore, the 
rules contained in Directive 2004/38 rely on the notion of ‘integration’ to link residence and protection 
Central and Eastern European Migration Review  45 
from expulsion: the longer the EU citizen has resided in a host state, the better integrated s/he is, there-
fore the better protected against expulsion.16 The Court has defined integration as based ‘not only on 
territorial and temporal factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the level of integration in 
the host Member State’.17 The commission of crimes and the execution of prison sentences are examples 
of situations that negatively affect the integration of the EU citizen and have the potential to undermine 
the higher level of protection against expulsion that is reserved for permanent resident EU citizens.18 
According to Article 32 of Directive 2004/38, the Member States can adopt an exclusion decision 
against an EU citizen on the grounds of public policy or public security provided that the safeguards of 
Article 27 are also met.19 The aim of an exclusion order is to prevent the EU citizen from re-entering the 
Member State that issued the order. The article does not specify whether such a decision always follows 
an expulsion measure. The excluded EU citizen can apply to have the measure lifted at the earliest three 
years after the enforcement of the order validly adopted in accordance with EU law. Recital 27 of the 
Directive specifies that life-long exclusion bans are prohibited.20 The EU citizen must show that there 
has been a material change in the circumstances which justified the exclusion decision and the Member 
State must reach a decision within six months of the submission. In the Petrea case,21 the CJEU clarified 
that a Member State can adopt an expulsion order against an EU citizen who returned to that state in 
spite of an existing exclusion order and who was seeking to have the latter order lifted as long as the 
examination of the application has been finally concluded. Petrea blurrs the difference in legal treatment 
between EU citizens and TCNs since it allows EU states to rely on the arrangements set out for the re-
moval of TCNs under the Return Directive in respect of EU citizens, too. 
Dutch rules on expulsion and exclusion on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health 
Articles 27, 28, 30 and 32 of Directive 2004/38 are implemented in Article 8.22 of the Aliens Decree. 
The most relevant part states that the residence right can be withdrawn or terminated on grounds of 
public order or public security where the personal conduct of the alien forms a present, real and serious 
threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. Before reaching a decision, the authorities must 
consider the EU citizen’s duration of residence, age, health situation, family and economic situation, so-
cial and cultural integration in the Netherlands and ties with the country of origin. An EU citizen whose 
right to reside has been restricted on public order or public security grounds is obliged to leave the 
Netherlands independently. Failure to do so can lead to forced removal by the authorities. Additionally, 
the EU citizen can be declared undesirable (Article 67 Dutch Alien Act). A pronouncement of undesira-
bility is an administrative measure that aims to ban a person who is no longer allowed to stay in the 
Netherlands. In most cases a pronouncement of undesirability is imposed on someone who has commit-
ted a crime. Failure to comply with the obligation to leave stemming from the declaration of undesira-
bility is a criminal offence (Article 197 Dutch Criminal Code). 
To decide on the termination of the right to reside on public order or public security grounds, the 
immigration authorities rely on a sliding scale that is applicable to all aliens who have committed crim-
inal offences in the Netherlands (Article 3.86 Aliens Decree). This scale takes the form of a table and is 
used to determine whether residence can be terminated on the basis of the conviction for a criminal 
offence. The table reflects the principle that aliens should enjoy greater protection against expulsion 
after a longer period of legal residence and must have committed a more serious public order crime to 
justify termination of their legal residence. While the sliding scale is meant to offer migrants and policy-mak-
ers a greater degree of legal certainty and limit the risk of arbitrary decisions, it fails to consider changes 
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in the alien’s behaviour since the commission of the crime and thus questions the urgency of the public 
order threat (ACVZ 2018).  
Concerning EU citizens, the sliding scale system is vulnerable to criticism in light of the principles of 
proportionality and effectiveness. The immigration authorities tend to skip the step of first assessing 
whether the benchmarks listed in Articles 27 and 28 Directive 2004/38 (personal conduct, present and 
sufficiently serious threat, proportionality etc.) allow for the termination of residence rights. Instead, 
where the EU citizen has committed a crime, they often directly apply the national system of the sliding 
scale to decide on the right to reside. 
In practice, the legal treatment of petty criminality has raised issues. The Implementation Guidelines 
that are used by IND caseworkers when applying the Aliens Decree stipulate that the immigration au-
thorities can terminate or withdraw the right to reside on grounds of petty criminality where the EU 
citizen habitually commits small criminal offences that, individually, could not lead to the termination 
or withdrawal of the right to reside (VC B 10/2.3). In such cases, the nature and number of criminal 
offences, as well as the damage caused to society, are relevant. EU citizens who engage in petty crimi-
nality feature regularly in the information letters through which Dutch ministers inform the Dutch par-
liament about the situation of EU citizens in the Netherlands. They are portrayed as a small but highly 
disruptive group of EU citizens over whom the Dutch authorities, including the municipalities in which 
such citizens are present, would prefer to have a much stronger grip in order to expel and remove them 
based on national, rather than EU, law. 
Existing jurisprudence indicates that administrative decisions still fall short concerning the require-
ment of a present, real and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the society. On 18 June 
2013, the Council of State gave an important judgment on how to approach the expulsion of habitual 
offenders.22 In this case, the EU citizen was pronounced undesirable and therefore had to leave the country. 
He or she had committed a number of petty crimes which, individually, were not enough to demonstrate that 
his/her behaviour constituted a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society 
even though, taken together, they fulfilled this condition. The Council of State declared the undesirability 
pronouncement in this case unjust but left enough room for the immigration authorities to decide otherwise 
in other situations given the circumstances of future cases. With a reference to the CJEU judgment in the 
Polat case,23 EU citizens convicted for several petty crimes in a row can still be pronounced undesirable (and 
therefore expelled) but the safeguards of Article 27 Directive 2004/38 must be applied beforehand.  
Fraud or abuse of rights  
Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 allows the Member States to adopt the necessary measures to refuse, 
terminate or withdraw any right conferred by the Directive in case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as 
marriages of convenience. Any such measures must respect the procedural safeguards stemming from 
Articles 30 and 31 and the principle of proportionality. The latter requires EU states to consider the 
gravity of the abuse before terminating rights and, where less restrictive measures are possible, these 
should be contemplated. Based on the Court’s case law, most cases where fraud or the abuse of rights 
have been invoked by the Member States revolve around TCN family members who enjoy derived rights 
of residence or entry based on the EU citizen’s exercise of free movement rights.24 The Member States’ 
sensitivity around marriages of convenience as a specific form of abuse or fraud prompted the Commis-
sion to issue guidelines on this topic (COM(2014) 604 final). There has, as yet, been no case where an 
exercise of free movement rights coupled with a request for social assistance has been addressed as  
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a question of fraud or abuse of rights although, in some states, ‘welfare tourism’ has been framed as 
abusive (Evans 2020).  
The CJEU interprets Article 35 as requiring ‘… first, a combination of objective circumstances in 
which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the EU rules, the purpose has not been 
achieved, and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the 
EU rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it’ (McCarthy, para. 54). Moreover, 
the Court clarifies that any measure restricting rights based on Article 35 can only be justified in indi-
vidual cases, no matter what the systemic concerns may be (Guild, Peers and Tomkin 2019: 310). 
Measures taken on Article 35 grounds could be followed by an expulsion measure as long as the princi-
ple of proportionality is also respected. 
Article 8.25 of the Dutch Aliens Decree, which implements Article 35 Directive 2004/38, uses a more 
general wording: ‘[t]he Minister may withdraw the right of residence if the alien has submitted wrongful 
information or has withheld information which should have had as a consequence the refusal of entry 
or residence’. This provision suggests that the grounds for withdrawal of the right of residence may be 
used in cases that actually are not covered by Article 35 of the Directive. The policy rules on abuse of 
rights are set out in the Implementation Guidelines of the Aliens Act ((VC) B10/2.3). Residence permis-
sion can be withheld or withdrawn according to this section if (i) the EU citizen or his/her family mem-
ber has provided incorrect information or withheld information which, if known, would have led to  
a refusal to grant entry or residence permission; or (ii) rights have been abused. Also listed in this enu-
meration is residence in another Member State as a family member of a Dutch citizen, that does not 
qualify as genuine and effective, the so-called Europe route.25 Following this enumeration, the imple-
mentation guidelines give a description of what is meant by ‘artificial behaviour’ – i.e. behaviour the sole 
purpose of which is to obtain a right of entry or residence under EU law. Although such behaviour, 
strictly speaking, satisfies conditions set out in EU law, it violates the purpose of those rules. A violation 
of EU law is, in any case, assumed by the IND if the sole purpose of obtaining a right of residence under 
Directive 2004/38 is to circumvent national laws and policy rules. 
There is some Dutch jurisprudence in this respect which mainly concerns marriages of convenience. 
Most cases are on the establishment of conflicting statements which justify the conclusion that there 
were serious doubts as to the nature of the marriage involved.26 Usually, the Council of State refers in 
such cases to the 2014 European Commission’s guidelines. It also emphasises that the burden of proof 
is with the immigration authorities and that no systematic and random controls are allowed consistent 
with the CJEU in McCarthy, supra note 24. 
Filling the gap between expulsion and effective removal 
The previous sections have shown that the power to restrict the residence rights of EU citizens or to 
expel or remove such persons is limited by EU law and its operation in the Dutch legal order. The num-
ber of persons who are issued with an expulsion order and declared undesirable is relatively small.  
As far as the available statistics and data provided by the Dutch immigration authorities allow us to 
conclude (see Figure 2), between 2016 and 2019, an average of 16,000 aliens per year had to leave the 
Netherlands, either voluntarily or forced. Of these aliens, 16 per cent (2,500) were forced to depart. The 
remaining 84 per cent left unforced, meaning that 29 per cent left demonstrable and 55 per cent non-de-
monstrable. Of these 2,500 forced departures per year from the Netherlands, only 10 per cent refer to 
EU citizens. Thus, an average of 250 EU citizens have been forced to depart each year, which is only  
1 out of every 2,300 registered EU citizens. Some nationalities figure more often in these statistics than 
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others. The ‘expulsions pro mille’ or dashed line in Figure 2 shows the average expulsion rate: 1 per 
2,000 citizens per EU state. This figure shows that, in the last four years, Romanians, Lithuanians and 
Latvians were five times more often than average forced to leave the Netherlands. Remarkably, Polish 
citizens, although the largest group of EU citizens in the Netherlands (indicated by the vertical bars in 
the figure), have an average expulsion rate – i.e. just over 1. 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of expulsions from the Netherlands (average between 2016 and 2019) of (non-Dutch) 
EU citizens who are usual resident in the Netherlands, by nationality 
 
Source: Dutch Repatriation and Return Service, https://data.overheid.nl/dataset/immigratie-dtenv-vertrek. 
 
The existing data on removed EU citizens do not necessarily support the politicised and securitised dis-
courses that circulate within the public sphere in relation to mobile EU citizens. This reflects the higher 
level of protection enjoyed by EU citizens in relation to expulsion and removal when compared with 
non-EU foreigners, since the Dutch authorities can issue exclusion orders only on grounds of public pol-
icy and security. It is worth stressing that the relevant part of the IND work instructions concerning the 
application of the rights of mobile EU citizens and their family members deals mainly with the expulsion 
and removal of TCN family members of EU citizens; only limited space is dedicated to the removal of EU 
citizens as such, reflecting their stronger position.27  
The more limited powers enjoyed by the Dutch authorities in relation to EU citizens are seen as caus-
ing problems at the local level. To deal effectively with homeless EU citizens and petty criminals, the 
Dutch authorities have developed an integrated approach to EU citizens who make a nuisance of them-
selves in public spaces, an approach that involves the cooperation of various central and local authori-
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a decision on the legality of residence of the EU citizen concerned, followed by a decision to leave the 
Netherlands (Kramer 2017: 24). However, not all EU citizens who are issued with a decision in fact leave 
and not in all cases is residence terminated. Thus, municipalities perceive as sources of nuisance those 
EU citizens whose rights of residence have been terminated but who do not comply with the obligation 
to leave the Netherlands, EU citizens who are homeless or destitute, and EU citizens who engage in petty 
criminality but cannot be expelled. Such persons are seen as posing a threat to the security, wellbeing 
and cohesion of the local community.  
The general context in which this takes place is one where the Dutch government and some munici-
palities have minimised access to social support for EU citizens, including access to shelters for homeless 
EU citizens (Scholten, Engbersen, van Ostaijen and Snel 2018). Some Dutch local authorities have devel-
oped programmes to assist the voluntary return of homeless and destitute EU citizens to their states of 
origin as a more effective alternative to (forced) state removal, which would first require a decision 
terminating residence. Existing local initiatives and their relative success in removing ‘unwanted’ EU 
citizens from the street prompted the Dutch government to set up a special fund, accessible to NGOs that 
operate return and reintegration projects for EU citizens. This is the so-called ‘subsidieregeling’,28 which mim-
ics the policy that is pursued in relation to irregular TCNs. Its focus consists of EU citizens who, although they 
intended to reside in the Netherlands, lack sufficient resources to fend for themselves; equally, they lack the 
resources to return on their own to their country of origin and will need social support when they get there.  
Stichting Barka is the largest NGO working with Dutch local municipalities in assisting the voluntary 
return of homeless EU citizens. Initially, Barka focused on Polish nationals in Utrecht. Currently, it co-
operates with a number of municipalities in the Netherlands (Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague) and 
has nation-wide mobile intervention teams. Its director, Magdalena Chwarścianek, estimated that there 
are about 3,000 homeless Polish nationals in the Netherlands. Based on its annual reports, the organi-
sation helps more than 500 persons per year to return to their state of nationality.29 About 70 per cent 
of them are Polish and the rest are from other CEE countries. The returns organised by Barka are vol-
untary, require the cooperation of the EU citizen concerned and include persons who have not yet lost 
their right to reside but whose integration in the Netherlands is deemed unsuccessful and lacking any 
opportunities. In our view, the organised return of a substantial number of Polish citizens could be in-
terpreted as an explanation of why the actual expulsion ratio for Polish nationals in Figure 2 is so low, 
since these EU citizens return ‘just before’ their residence is terminated and they are expelled. There is 
no information available on the effectiveness of these returns or on Polish returnees going back to the 
Netherlands. The website of Barka provides anecdotal information about returnees living on ‘care 
farms’ in Poland as part of reintegration projects run by the Polish branch of Barka.30   
Conclusions 
This contribution has examined Dutch legal responses to ‘unwanted’ EU citizens. Although CEE mobility 
has been politicised and securitised through its depiction as a source of crime and welfare abuse, the 
available data on the number of EU citizens who have been expelled show a different reality. We have 
identified tensions between EU law and its transposition and application at the national level caused by 
the repeat attempts of Dutch immigration authorities to apply as strictly as possible EU rules. At this 
level of the analysis, in respect of the denial of residence rights based on appeals to social assistance or 
on the grounds of public policy and public security, we notice a constant search for the limits of the 
discretion left by EU law to national authorities to the detriment of the rights of mobile EU citizens. Dutch 
courts have played an ambiguous role, sometimes upholding the restrictive interpretation proposed by the 
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immigration authorities and other times seeking to uphold the EU requirements of proportionality and ef-
fectiveness by emphasising the obligation of the administrative authorities to perform an individual assess-
ment in all cases where the right to reside or the possibility to expel are questioned.  
In our view, the much higher number of EU citizens who are helped to return voluntarily via Barka 
as opposed to expelled EU citizens suggests that EU law poses clear limits to the power of Dutch author-
ities to deal with ‘unwanted’ EU citizens, be they petty criminals or unemployed. To deny EU residence 
rights, the Dutch authorities must mobilise resources and ensure that the safeguards prescribed by EU 
law have been satisfied. Creating alternatives to the legal termination of residence is probably cheaper 
and more effective than enforcing return and has the advantage of not clogging up the administrative or the 
judicial systems with claims in respect of which a higher threshold than the national one has to be met. This 
strategic approach to EU mobility, which sees cooperation between different levels and across different 
branches of government and civic society, deserves further investigation as it raises complex questions about 
the roles of law and policy in the governance of EU mobility, issues of responsibility stemming from the ex-
ercise of EU mobility rights and the best way to ensure that the rights of EU citizens are effectively respected 
in practice. Our analysis shows that the higher threshold of protection applicable to EU citizens has an impact 
on how the national authorities engage with their mobility despite its politicised image.  
Conflict of interest statement 
No conflict of interest was reported by the authors. 
ORCID IDs 
Sandra Mantu  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7681-4586 
Paul Minderhoud  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8827-7810 
Carolus Grütters  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2826-932X 
Notes 
1 CJEU 21 December 2011, C-424/10 and C-425/10, Ziolkowski & Szeja, EU:C:2011:866, para. 46. 
2 CJEU 15 September 2015, C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597.  
3 CJEU 20 September 2001, C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 43; CJEU 7 September 2004, 
C-456/02, Trojani, EU:C:2004:488, para. 3. 
4 CJEU 19 September 2013, C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565; CJEU 11 November 2014, C-333/13, 
Dano, EU:C:2014:2358; CJEU 15 September 2015, C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597; CJEU 25 Feb-
ruary 2016, C-299/14, Garcia-Nieto, EU:C:2016:114; CJEU 14 June 2016, C-308/14, Commission  
v. United Kingdom, EU:C:2016:436. 
5 CJEU 20 December 2017, C-442/16, Gusa, EU:C:2017:1004; CJEU 11 April 2019, C-483/17 Tarola, 
EU:C:2019:309. 
6 Central Appeals Tribunal 18 March 2013, NL:CRVB:2013:BZ3853 and 20 January 2015, 
NL:CRVB:2015:57.  
7 District Court The Hague 1 September 2015, case number AWB 15/4877. 
8 District Court The Hague 18 January 2016, NL:RBDHA:2016:3075. 
9 Council of State 7 November 2018, NL:RVS:2018:3584 and 3585. 
10 District Court The Hague 19 April 2019, AWB 18/4352. 
Central and Eastern European Migration Review  51 
11 CJEU 12 March 2014, C-456/12, O&B, EU:C:2014:135. 
12 Council of State 21 February 2019, NL:RVS:567. 
13 Council of State 25 September 2019, NL:RVS:2019:3262. 
14 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Dutch Council of State, lodged on 30 September 2019, 
Case C-719/19.  
15 The Court has considered this issue explicitly in cases of restrictions placed on exit by the state of 
the migrant’s own nationality with a view to securing the repayment of debts owed to the state (CJEU 
17 November 2011, C-434/10 Aladzhov, EU:C:2011:750) or to a private entity (CJEU 4 October 2012, 
C-249/11, Byankov, EU:C:2012:608). Only in the latter case did the Court find that such a measure 
clearly served purely economic ends and was prohibited by EU law – see Guild et al. (2019: 266–267). 
16 See, for example, CJEU 23 November 2010, C-145/09, Tsakouridis, EU:C:2010:708, para. 25. 
17 CJEU 16 January 2014, C-378/12, Onuekwere, EU:C:2014:13, para. 24. 
18 See, for example, CJEU 17 April 2018, C-316/16, B. and CJEU 17 April 2018, C-424/16,Vomero, 
EU:C:2018:256. 
19 In CJEU 4 October 2012, C-249/11, Byankov, EU:C:2012:608, the Court has found that Article 32 
applies also to national measures preventing the EU citizen from leaving his state of nationality.   
20 The rule stems from CJEU 19 January 1999, C-348/96, Calfa, EU:C:1999:6 and was further elabo-
rated on in CJEU 4 October 2012, C-249/11, Byankov, EU:C:2012:608.  
21 CJEU 14 September 2017, C-184/16, Petrea, EU:C:2017:684. 
22 Council of State 18 June 2013, NL:RVS:2013:62. 
23 CJEU 4 October 2007, C-349/06, Polat, EU:C:2007:581. 
24 CJEU 19 October 2004, C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, EU:C:2004, 639; CJEU 25 July 2008, C-127/08, 
Metock, EU:C:2008:449; CJEU 18 December 2014, C-202/13, McCarthy a.o., EU:C:2014:2450; CJEU 16 
July 2015, C-218/14, Singh, EU:C:2015:476. 
25 Under this construction a Dutch citizen resides for a consecutive period of a minimum of three 
months with a third-country family member in another member state and claims upon return to the 
Netherlands a derived right of residence for the family member under Article 21 TFEU. This con-
struction is of interest because the EU rules regarding family reunification are more liberal than the 
Dutch rules. See CJEU 12 March 2014, C-456/12, O&B, EU:C:2014:135. 
26 See, inter alia, Dutch Council of State 19 October 2017, NL:RVS:2017:2847, Dutch Council of State 
20 July 2016, NL:RVS:2016:2120 and 2006.  
27 IND, Werkinstructies SUA, WI2018/4 Het Recht van de Europese Unie, pp. 34–35. 
28 Subsidieregeling ondersteuning zelfstandig vertrek 2019, Staatscourant No. 71321, 19 December 
2018. 
29 Reports are available at https://www.barkanl.org/anbi/ (accessed: 26 June 2021). The following 
data are available: 2014 – 606 persons; 2015 – 698 persons; 2016 – 507 persons and 2017 – 537 
persons. 
30 https://www.barkanl.org/het-parool-van-dakloze-naar-boer/ (accessed: 26 June 2021). 
References 
ACVZ (2018). Gewogen gevaar; de belangenafweging in het vreemdelingrechtelijke openbare-orde beleid. 
The Hague: Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken. 
Anderson B. (2012). What Does ‘The Migrant’ Tell Us About the (Good) Citizen? Working Paper 94. Oxford: 
University of Oxford. 
52 S. Mantu, P. Minderhoud, C. Grütters 
Asscher L. F. (2014). EU-arbeidsmigratie, voortgang en maatregelen – Vrij verkeer werknemers van de 
nieuwe EU-lidstaten. Tweede Kamer 2014–2015, 29 407, no. 198. 
Asscher L. F. (2017). Vrij verkeer werknemers uit nieuwe EU-lidstaten. Tweede Kamer 2016–2017,  
29 407, no. 209. 
Brouwer J., van der Woude M., van der Leun J. (2018). (Cr)immigrant Framing in Border Areas: Decision-
Making Processes of Dutch Border Police Officers. Policing and Society 28(4): 448–463.  
CBS (2020). Werk en gezin belangrijkste migratiemotieven voor immigranten. Online: https://www.cbs.n 
l/nl-nl/nieuws/2020/30/werk-en-gezin-belangrijkste-migratiemotieven-voor-immigranten (accessed: 
18 June 2021). 
CBS (2021). Hoeveel immigranten komen naar Nederland? Online: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/ 
dossier-asiel-migratie-en-integratie/hoeveel-immigranten-komen-naar-nederland- (accessed: 18 June 
2021).  
Cremers J. (2011). In Search of Cheap Labour in Europe: Working and Living Conditions of Posted Workers. 
Brussels/Utrecht: European Institute for Construction Labour Research/International Books, CLR 
Studies No. 6. 
ECAS (2014). Fiscal Impact of EU Migrants in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Brussels: 
European Citizen Action Service. Online: http://ecas.org/fiscal-impact-eu-migrants-selected-coun-
tries (accessed: 18 June 2021).  
Evans M. (2020). Abusing or Misusing the Right of Free Movement? The UK’s Policy towards EU Nation-
als Sleeping Rough, in: S. Mantu, P. Minderhoud, E. Guild (eds), EU Citizenship and Free Movement 
Rights, pp. 302–322. Leiden: Brill. 
FEANTSA (2019). The ‘Working Poor’ and EU Free Movement: The Notion of ‘Worker’ in the Context of 
Low-Wage and Low-Hour Employment. Online: https://www.feantsa.org/en/report/2019/05/22/th 
e-working-poor-and-eu-free-movement-the-notion-of-worker-in-the-context-of-low-wage-and-low 
-hour-employment (accessed: 18 June 2021). 
Gijsberts M., Andriessen I., Nicolaas H., Huijnk W. (2018). Bouwend aan een toekomst in Nederland. De 
leefsituatie van Poolse migranten die zich na 2004 hebben ingeschreven. Sociaal en Cultureel Planbu-
reau. Online: https://www.scp.nl/publicaties/publicaties/2018/04/24/bouwend-aan-een-toekoms 
t-in-nederland (accessed: 28 June 2021) 
Guild E., Peers S., Tomkin J. (2019). The EU Citizenship Directive. A Commentary. Second edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Heindlmaier A. (2020). Mobile EU Citizens and the ‘Unreasonable Burden’. How Member States Deal 
with Residence Rights at the Street-Level, in: S. Mantu, P. Minderhoud, E. Guild (eds), EU Citizenship 
and Free Movement Rights, pp. 129–154. Leiden: Brill. 
Heindlmaier A., Blauberger M. (2017). Enter at Your Own Risk: Free Movement of EU Citizens in Practice. 
West European Politics 40(6): 1198–1217. 
ICF/GHK (2013). A Fact Finding Analysis on the Impact on the Member States’ Social Security Systems of 
the Entitlements of Non-Active Intra-EU Migrants to Special Non-Contributory Cash Benefits and 
Healthcare Granted on the Basis of Residence. Online: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/c6de1d0a-2a5b-4e03-9efb-ed522e6a27f5/language-en (accessed: 18 June 2021). 
Kamp H. G. J. (2011). Maatregelen arbeidsmigratie uit Midden en Oost-Europa. AV/SDA/2011/4771, pp. 
8–10. Online https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/violk8w42dyi 
(accessed: 28 June 2021). 
Karstens F. (2020). How Public Discourse Affects Attitudes towards Freedom of Movement and 
Schengen. European Union Politics 21(1): 43–63.  
Central and Eastern European Migration Review  53 
Koolmees W., Ollongren K., Knoops R., van Ark T., Keijzer M. (2019). Aanpak misstanden arbeidsmigran-
ten, 21 June 2019. Online: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/12/ 
20/kamerbrief-over-integrale-aanpak-misstanden-arbeidsmigranten (accessed: 28 June 2021). 
Kramer D. (2016). Earning Social Citizenship in the European Union: Free Movement and Access to So-
cial Assistance Benefits Reconstructed. Cambridge Yearbook of Legal Studies 18: 270–301. 
Kramer D. (2017). ‘In Search of the Law’: Governing Homeless EU Citizens in a State of Legal Ambiguity. 
ACCESS Europe Research Paper 2017/04. Amsterdam: VU University Amsterdam. Online: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3091539 (accessed: 18 June 2021). 
Kramer D., Sampson T. J., van Hooren F. (2018). Responding to Free Movement: Quarantining Mobile 
Union Citizens in European Welfare States. Journal of European Public Policy 25(10): 1501–1521.  
Mantu S. (2018). Controlling ‘Poverty Migration’– Asserting Gradations of EU Citizenship, in: H. Mercier, 
E. Ni Chaoimh, L. Damay, G. Delledone (eds), La Libre Circulation Sous Pression, Régulation et Dérégu-
lation des Mobilités dans l’Union Européenne, pp. 170–184. Brussels: Bruylant. 
Mantu S., Minderhoud P. (2019). Exploring the Links between Residence and Social Rights for Econom-
ically Inactive EU Citizens. European Journal of Migration and Law 21(3): 313–337. 
Minderhoud P. (2018). Social Assistance for Economically Inactive EU Citizens in the Member States. Cen-
tre for Migration Law Working Paper Series 2018/03. Nijmegen: Radboud University. 
Minderhoud P., Mantu S. (2017). Back to the Roots? No Access to Social Assistance for Union Citizens 
Who are Economically Inactive, in: D. Thym, (ed.), Questioning EU Citizenship. Judges and the Limits 
of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU, pp. 191–207. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
O’Brien C., Spaventa E., de Coninck J. (2016). Comparative Report: The Concept of Worker under Article 
45 TFEU and Certain Non-Standard Forms of Employment. Brussels: European Commission. 
Scholten P., Engbersen G., van Ostaijen M., Snel E. (2018). Multilevel Governance from Below: How Dutch 
Cities Respond to Intra-EU Mobility. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(12): 2011–2033. 
Strockmeijer A. (2019). Stromen Oost-Europese arbeidsmigranten vaker de WW in dan Nederlandse 
werknemers? UWV Kennisverslag 2.  
Valcke A. (2020). Expulsions from the ‘Heart of Europe’: The Belgian Law and Practice Relating to the 
Termination of EU Residence Rights, in: S. Mantu, P. Minderhoud, E. Guild (eds), EU Citizenship and 
Free Movement Rights, pp. 155–189. Leiden: Brill. 
Van Melle B., Van Houwelingen T. (2019). Belangenafweging bij verwijderingsmaatregel tegen Unie-
burger. Asiel&Migrantenrecht 3: 113–116. 
Verschueren H. (2018). The Right to Reside and to Social Benefits for Economically Inactive EU Migrants: 
How to Balance Freedom of Movement and Solidarity?, in: H. Mercier, E. Ni Chaoimh, L. Damay,  
G. Delledone (eds), La Libre Circulation Sous Pression: Régulation et Dérégulation des Mobilités dans 
l'Union Européenne, pp. 33–52. Brussels: Bruylant. 
 
How to cite this article: Mantu S., Minderhoud P., Grütters C. (2021). Legal Approaches to ‘Unwanted’ EU 
Citizens in the Netherlands. Central and Eastern European Migration Review 10(1): 35–53. 
 
